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Introduction 
The EU: Trojan horse of capitalism or opportunity for representative democracy? 
The question of whether democracy and capitalism can be reconciled is not new, though for a 
number of decades it was seemingly answered in the affirmative by the majority of political 
scientists. In recent decades, however, several tensions between democracy and capitalism have 
become apparent, which severely impede certain basic ideals and elements of representative 
democracy, such as equality, participation, and political and social rights. These problems have 
been discussed in a growing number of publications, and have been broached in the present 
journal through a series of contributions from Wolfgang Merkel (Merkel 2014, 2016) Wolfgang 
Streeck (2015) and Colin Crouch (2015). The present article seeks to contribute to this debate 
by placing special focus on the European Union.  
In two of the above-mentioned articles – those by Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck – and 
in several other recent contributions in the debate on capitalism and democracy, the European 
Union has been discussed in highly critical terms. Wolfgang Streeck, for example, claims that 
the EU is at the forefront of capitalism’s attack on representative democracy, and that in order 
to save some of the substance of representative democracy, the EU needs to be partially 
dismantled. On the basis of an argument by German constitutional lawyer Herman Heller 
(Heller [1933] 2015), a number of scholars have even claimed that the EU is drifting toward an 
“authoritarian liberalism” that combines economic deregulation with authoritarian de-
democratisation (Menéndez 2015; Scheuerman 2015; Somek 2015).  
Other authors do not see the EU in such critical terms and argue that it is possible to reconcile 
capitalism and democracy in today’s EU (see e.g. Merkel 2014, 2016). A straightforwardly 
positive account of the EU is given by Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1999, 2001) who regards 
the EU as a possible means of regulating global capitalism.  
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Finally, despite such contributions on the question of capitalism and democracy in the EU, the 
bulk of mainstream EU studies would hardly even think of raising this question – most likely 
because a free market economy is one of the bases of the EU. The idea that this may pose a 
problem is by no means widely shared in the academic debate.  
Against this backdrop, the present article seeks to further examine the relation between 
capitalism and democracy in the European Union and to discuss the possible consequences of 
this relationship for institutional and democratic reform and future developments. Building on 
the discussion in the four articles noted above, the present article pursues the question of 
whether there is a possibility of democratic governance in the EU, or whether the EU has to be 
regarded as the Trojan horse of capitalism.  
The next section will recapitulate the main arguments put forward by Crouch, Merkel and 
Streeck (2). This will be followed by a brief discussion of the institutional dimension of 
democracy in the EU’s multilevel system (3.1.) as well as its politico-cultural dimensions (3.2.). 
The fourth section will discuss the complex contexts and actors influencing the relation between 
democracy and capitalism (or rather, liberalization and deregulation) within the EU. In the fifth 
and final section I shall consider whether and to what extent democracy is possible within the 
EU’s system of liberal capitalism, and how representative democracy in the EU and the EU 
multilevel system could be safeguarded and improved under current conditions. 
 
2. The EU, democracy, and globalised capitalism: Pessimism, optimism, or middle 
ground? 
The connections between capitalism and democracy, their influence upon each other, and the 
tensions that capitalism has created for democracy since the 1970s have been discussed in depth 
in the four above-mentioned articles. What all authors agree on is that the dominance of a 
market-oriented, financialised form of capitalism that has developed since the 1970s threatens 
representative democracy at its core, since this form of capitalism challenges (Merkel 2014, p. 
118): The basic democratic principle that authoritative political decisions can only be taken by 
those who have earned the requisite legitimacy through constitutional-democratic procedures, 
and the principle of political equality, which is undermined by the asymmetrical distribution of 
socioeconomic resources among citizens, largely to the disadvantage of lower social classes. 
In Wolfgang Merkel’s view (Merkel 2014), this brings about four serious problems for 
representative democracy: 1) socioeconomic inequality leads to political inequality and 
asymmetrical political participation, 2) elections are increasingly unable to stem growing 
socioeconomic inequalities, 3) the state becomes vulnerable and loses its capacity to act, and 4) 
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political decision-making is moved away from parliament to the executive. Merkel concludes 
that these developments put pressure on four out of the five partial regimes of embedded 
democracy: elections, political participation, horizontal accountability, and the effective power 
to govern. He therefore states that “financial capitalism is harmful for democracy as it has 
cracked its social and political embeddedness” (Merkel 2014, p. 125).  
In his contribution, Streeck (Streeck 2015) supports most of these arguments. He disagrees, 
however, with regard to the third partial regime in Merkel’s model of ‘embedded democracy’: 
civil rights. While Merkel (Merkel 2014, p. 125) concludes that improvements have been made 
within this partial regime through a drive toward greater gender equality, civil rights, and strong 
political NGOs, Streeck declares that such changes are the result of “pseudo-participation in 
pseudo-debates” (Streeck 2015, p. 52). Nevertheless, decades of gender and civil rights research 
and related empirical findings on discrimination and its effects have taught us that gender and 
ethnicity are highly relevant where inequality is concerned. It is not only cultural inequality and 
feelings of anxiety that manifest along ethnic, gender and educational lines, but also “hard” 
economic inequality. Moreover, in light of the relevant EU policies, it is no surprise that civil 
rights have improved in recent decades, as will be discussed below. The field of civil rights and 
antidiscrimination is one in which the EU and particularly the Court of Justice of the European 
union (CJEU; formerly European Court of Justice, ECJ) and the EU Commission have fought 
for positive integration, i.e., the creation of new regulations. This field is therefore particularly 
interesting in the EU context. Moreover, it seems as if an increase in civil rights goes well 
together with market liberalisation ta least to some extent. This is a topic that deserves further 
investigation.  
Streeck also highlights two other important points: first, he claims that an awareness of social 
class and power needs to be restored to mainstream political science more fully; second, he 
states that it is crucial to include the European Union in any reflection on how capitalism and 
democracy may or may not be reconciled in future. He rightly argues that “the European Union 
is now the foremost institution that would need to be `reformed´ if there is to be any restoration 
of democracy of the sort Merkel has in mind” (Streeck 2015, p. 56).  
Streeck´s perspective on the European Union is nonetheless highly critical. In his view, the 
most recent 2014 European Parliament elections amount to an “election charade”, in which “a 
notorious bank lobbyist and privy tax councillor to global corporations [Juncker, was 
appointed] to the highest office of ‘Europe’, and in which “there is little hope if any for ` Europe´ 
being of help with Merkel´s project to re-establish egalitarian-democratic control over 
financialized capitalism” (Streeck 2015, p. 56). He therefore concludes that capitalism should 
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be de-globalised and that embedded democracy should be restored by re-embedding capitalism 
at the national level (Streeck 2015 59-60).  
In his own reply to Merkel’s article, Colin Crouch (Crouch 2015) also takes a critical 
perspective on the EU. He argues that the EU “has long been an example of post-democracy: 
an institution with all the formal trappings of democracy, but where these have been developed 
in a top-down, bureaucratic way […]”. Even if he is sympathetic to Streeck´s argument 
according to which the EU is capable of “promoting non- or even anti-democratic capitalism” 
(Crouch 2015, p. 69), he departs from him in two respects. First, he is critical of Streeck´s 
advocacy of a return to the national level, since he claims that this, and the ensuing European 
disintegration, would favour national protectionism and ultimately lead to a more unfavourable 
state of affairs. Second, he adopts a more optimistic perspective on the EU (see below).  
In the final contribution to this debate, Merkel (Merkel 2016) takes up the abovmentioned 
criticism of the European Union. He also doubts that there would be a simple way of making 
the EU an agent capable of regulating capitalism:  
“It remains unclear if not utopian, however, why the EU, which is 
characterized by the dominant role of competition law and whose 28 member 
states have no intention to implement anything like tax harmonization […] 
would want to reach a consensus on constructing a truly democratic union 
that reins in the power of the City of London, puts an end to the free-riding 
tax polices of low-tax countries […] and subjects the European Central Bank 
to democratic control.” (Merkel 2016, p. 72).  
But Merkel ultimately pleads in favour of a form of regulated capitalism in the EU. He argues 
that it is possible to find a middle ground between optimism and pessimism, on the basis of 
Harvard economist Dani Rodrik’s seven proposals for the regulation of globalized capitalism.  
 
The debate has shown that EU market liberalisation represents a a challenge to democracy – 
but to what extent? Is it, then, possible to reconcile democracy and capitalism in the EU? In the 
following I shall first briefly discuss the current state of representative democracy in the EU, 
before enquiring into the relations between democracy and capitalism (or rather economic and 
financial deregulation) in the EU.   
 
3. Democracy in the EU 
Before discussing the relationship between democracy and capitalism in the EU context, I shall 
briefly consider democracy within the EU multilevel system, focussing first on its institutional 
dimensions and then on its politico-cultural dimensions.  
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3.1. The institutional dimension of democracy in the EU and the multilevel system 
The question of whether there is a “democratic deficit” in the EU has been discussed in depth 
since the 1990s. While the positions in this debate are relatively well-known, the underlying 
problems it has raised are also important for the issues in question here.  
To begin with, there is little agreement among academics on the nature of the EU. On one view 
the EU is considered to be an intergovernmental entity (see e.g. Majone 1998; Moravscik 2002) 
that does not need to be further democratised since its member states provide it with sufficient 
legitimation. On another, more recent view, the EU is a political system comparable to other 
political systems (see e.g. Hix and Høyland 2013; Tömmel 2014) and one that should also be 
further democratised.  
Though this discussion may at first sight appear to be purely academic, it is nonetheless 
important to an understanding of the different ways in which one might evaluate the EU. If one 
takes the view that the EU is an intergovernmental entity, one will be rather sceptical about the 
necessity and possibility of democratising the EU, whereas if one regards the EU as a political 
system, this implies that it can also potentially be a kind of full-fledged representative 
democratic system – whatever this means concretely in the multi-level practice.  
The argument presented in the following is based on the view that a) the EU is to be regarded 
as a political system that b) has been increasingly democratised and c) should still be further 
democratised. From this perspective, a number of critical remarks can be made with respect to 
the EU level (see Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008 for overviews). Yet it is important to stress 
that any assessment of the EU’s democratic character should moreover take into account the 
whole multilevel system, i.e., the EU and its interrelations with its 28 current member states. 
From this standpoint, a number of flaws and democratic challenges can be observed that regard 
the institutional dimension.  
First, EU policies are no longer merely regulative; they also have redistributive effects 
(Beetham and Lord 1998, pp. 17–19; Føllesdal and Hix 2006, p. 551). The EU therefore exerts 
a strong influence on the everyday life of its citizens. This fact indicates the need for substantial 
democratic legitimation of the EU and its policies, including the dimension of input legitimacy. 
Second, legitimation chains in the EU are still long and rather opaque, so that accountability is 
not always easily attributable. Council members, for instance, receive their legitimation through 
national elections and national parliaments, i.e. by way of a long chain. Commission members 
are appointed by the member states’ governments, though after a number of political struggles 
the EP has obtained the right to approve the Commission as a body and to influence the selection 
of the Commissioners to a certain degree (see Tiilikainen and Wiesner 2016).  
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Third, input legitimacy is still weaker at the EU level than in the member states’ own 
democracies (Beetham and Lord 1998, pp. 17–19; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003). National 
representative democracies therefore comply better with the needs of democratic input 
legitimacy, yet they have continued to transfer competencies to the EU level in various ways 
(see below). In consequence, European integration has led to a net loss of input legitimacy 
within the multilevel system (Beetham and Lord 1998, pp. 17–19; Habermas 1999, pp. 186–
187). 
Fourth, and directly related to this, EU institutions have enlarged their competencies in recent 
decades without acquiring a representative-democratic legislative underpinning equal to that of 
its member states. Since in this same period the representative democracies and legislatives of 
these member states saw their competencies partly transferred to the EU, executive powers 
generally increased in the EU multilevel system, while legislative powers decreased (Føllesdal 
and Hix 2006, pp. 534–537; Mény 2003). Moreover, crucial powers were also transferred to 
the EU’s judiciary branch and to agents and agencies (see below in detail).  
In sum, decision-making powers in the EU multilevel system have been continually withdrawn 
from the sphere of representative democracy and political participation (Habermas 2001). The 
balance has shifted in favour of the executive and judiciary branches. Rather than a 
politicization of EU-politics, we can thus observe its de-politicisation (Checkel and Katzenstein 
2009; Diez Medrano 2009; Mény 2003).  
The Lisbon Treaty has served to remedy certain of these issues, particularly by assigning greater 
powers to the directly elected European Parliament (EP). In a number of policy areas, the latter 
is now the first legislative chamber, and along with the Council is jointly responsible for 
decision-making. Nevertheless, the short account of the EU’s democratic deficit given above 
has already indicated that the problem setting is more complex. Precisely locating the EU’s 
institutional democratic deficit is far from a simple matter and requires a careful examination 
of the dynamics of legitimacy, democracy, and the balance of powers within the multi-level 
system as a whole.  
3.2. The politico-cultural dimensions of democracy in the EU and the multi-level system 
A second strand of the debate around democracy and the democratic deficit in the EU addresses 
the question of whether the EU has, or can have, a proper demos. As the argument at the heart 
of this debate claims, input legitimacy requires a democratic subject that can properly grant it. 
It is often argued that the population of the EU is a long way from constituting such a demos. 
This too represents a decisive move in the debate: if there is no demos that can legitimately 
provide input-legitimacy, on what basis should the representative institutions work? Such 
6 
 
arguments inevitably lead to the favouring of output or throughput legitimacy, as has been 
repeatedly claimed by Fritz Scharpf (Scharpf 1999). 
The question of whether the EU can develop a fully fledged demos and whether it is already on 
the way to doing so cannot be discussed here in detail (see Wiesner 2014a for a detailed 
treatment), though a few remarks can be made on this subject. Democracy needs to be based on 
a demos, a democratic subject, that at least minimally a) defines itself as such (through the 
mutual recognition of the citizens or demos-members), b) identifies with the EU as a polity (e.g. 
through identification and support), and c) is politically active in the EU as a polity (Wiesner 
2014a, pp. 38–43). 
There is nonetheless good reason to believe that in the EU such a democratic subject is already 
in development. To take just one indicator, drawn from Eurobarometer data, we can observe 
that the majority of EU citizens identify themselves as citizens of the EU. According to the last 
Eurobarometer Survey (Eurobarometer 2016, p. 38), roughly two thirds of EU citizens say so 
(66%). In 26 member states, the majority of citizens say that they feel this way. There is, 
however, considerable national variation: in Luxemburg, nearly all citizens feel themselves to 
be EU citizens (93%), followed by Malta (84%), Finland (82%), and Ireland (80%). 
Interestingly enough, a majority of UK citizens (53%) also say so. In Italy and Bulgaria only 
49% of people feel this way, and Greece is the only member state where the majority of citizens 
do not feel themselves to be EU citizens (54% No and 46% Yes). Since all Eurobarometer polls 
have indicated a severe reduction in people’s identification with and support for the EU and its 
policies in the countries hit hardest by the financial crisis, this is hardly surprising.  
Without claiming that such a sense of EU citizenship is by itself sufficient for strong input 
legitimacy that would also justify redistributive policies, it may be argued that it perfectly 
qualifies EU citizens to be the demos that elects the EP. Yet it is also true that, alongside this 
EU-related demos, the EU will depend in future on the stronger demoi within the member states 
and the member state-related input legitimacy they provide, and this speaks all the more in 
favour of taking the whole multi-level system into consideration when discussing democracy 
in the EU. In sum, we can speak here both of stronger, older, national demoi on the one hand, 
and a more recent, weaker, EU-related demos on the other.2  
While I therefore claim that there is enough of a demos in the EU to enable input legitimacy at 
the EU level, a further significant finding in the field of politico-cultural studies is that 
                                                 
2
 This argument differs from that made within the demoicracy debate: proponents of demoicracy mainly argue that 
only national demoi can provide a legitimating foundation for the EU (see e.g. Nicolaïdis 2013). 
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throughout the recent financial crisis, identification with, trust in, and support for democratic 
institutions at both the EU and the national level have decisively shrunk (see the Eurobarometer 
results since 2008; Eurobarometer). Between 2011 and 2013, for instance, more than 60% of 
those polled by Eurobarometer did not feel that their voice counted in the EU and only around 
30% of those polled felt that their voice did count. Trust in EU institutions declined by 
approximately 20 percentage points between 2007 (around 50%) and 2015 (just above 30%). 
Furthermore, trust in national parliaments and national governments, which is usually lower 
than trust in EU institutions, also declined in parallel, from 35% (parliaments) and 34% 
(governments) to 28% (parliaments) and 27% (governments). While trust in the EU thus 
declined more decisively, national institutions were also severely affected by the effects of the 
financial crisis on citizens’ trust. This indicates, first, that in the multilevel system legitimacy 
beliefs no longer are solely directedat either the EU level or the nation state level, since these 
two are linked. Second, it indicates that the sovereign debt crisis has affected citizen´s views 
on the EU. In this regard, the EU’s input legitimacy deficits have increased during the crisis.  
 
4. Democracy in the EU’s system of liberal capitalism 
Returning now to the topic of democracy and capitalism in the EU, the key question is whether 
the EU is the Trojan horse of capitalism, or whether capitalism can be restrained within or by 
the EU. In the following, I shall argue for a position of enlightened optimism, according to 
which the EU can restrain capitalism under certain conditions and circumstances.  
 
4.1. Is the EU an agent of capitalism, or does it only act as such? 
Taking our cue from an expression that sprang up in German social democratic thinking in the 
debates around “Stamokap” theory, the first crucial question we need to ask here is whether the 
EU is a natural agent of capitalism or whether it only acts as such. My claim is that it only acts 
as such. There are nevertheless a number of complex reasons as to why it does so.  
The first of these lies within the EU’s historical origins. The initial aim of European integration 
was not to found a supranational democratic federation, nor to regulate capitalism, as the 
European Federalist movements had wished. Its initial goals were to create a balance of power 
in Europe, to centralise control over the core industries of coal and steel, and to integrate into 
the Western political sphere a West Germany that would be subject to long-term control. 
Economic integration was seen as the tool capable of realizing all of these goals. The project 
was based on nation states and national governments, and integration was to be fuelled by the 
economic and political self-interest of the latter.  
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This direction of integration relates to a decisive failure. The draft treaty on a European Political 
Community (EPC) was close to ratification in the early 1950s. Related to the existing European 
Community of Coal and Steel and also to the Plan for a European Community of Defence 
(EDC), the EPC Treaty foresaw a fully fledged, two chamber parliament. One chamber was to 
be directly elected by EU citizens, the other was a senate consisting of delegates from the 
national parliaments. A draft constitution was even developed on the initiative of the ECSC 
foreign ministers (Europäische Politische Gemeinschaft 1953). But ratification of the EPC 
Treaty was stopped in 1954 by the French parliament, and plans for the strong democratisation 
of the EU were brought to a halt for some time. Afterwards, in the first three decades of the 
integration process, integration focused on the creation of an internal market (Wiesner 2014b).  
This historical background provides us with the first key reason as to why the EU is able to act 
as an agent of economic liberalisation. The EU treaties, i.e., the EEC, ECSC and Euratom 
treaties and those that followed, make a point of abolishing all obstacles to a successful internal 
market. On the basis of these treaties and the four classical freedoms (free movement of trade 
and goods, services, labour, and capital) obstacles to the free market were successively 
abolished. In other words, it can justifiably be claimed that the EU treaties helped and still help 
to pave the way for market liberalisation, removing all possible barriers to free trade. In several 
cases, national social standards have been interpreted as being such barriers (see below).  
Deregulation served the interests of what in the US is often termed “big money” rather than 
small enterprises. Financial industries and big companies emerged as the winners of this 
process, while small businesses and agricultural entrepreneurs lost out. Furthermore, while 
younger and highly skilled individuals benefitted from the right to free movement, a new EU-
proletariat also emerged. In the city of Frankfurt, some EU citizens will earn a fortune in 
investment banking, while other EU citizens working on the ECB building site are almost 
completely lacking in rights due to their status as posted workers – a status that largely 
invalidates German trade union action and social laws (Lilie 2016).  
The treaties themselves, however, are only part of the explanation. An important role was also 
played by their interpreters, namely the EU Commission and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU, formerly the European Court of Justice, ECJ). In a German-language 
article, Dieter Grimm (Grimm 2014) described the role of the latter, noting two decisive factors: 
first, the ECJ acted as an agent of integration and deregulation; second, the EU treaties, in the 
form of EU primary law, regulate policy fields that would normally be subject to secondary 
law.  
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Grimm summarises the underlying story as follows: after the projects of the EPC and the EDC 
had failed, a common market was the easy way out, since it could be planned and built in a 
technical and non-political manner, i.e., without broad public debate. It could also be 
legitimized through its success. In the seemingly non-political EEC, politics – in the sense of 
debating, offering alternatives, working on pros and cons – was restricted to the nation state 
level.  
The ECJ acquired its key role through two rulings it passed in 1963 and 1964 that claimed EU 
law to be superior to nation state law—a move that has been interpreted as a 
constitutionalisation of the treaties. And it indeed was a decisive move, since the treaties 
regulate a number of fields and issues that in a nation state would fall under secondary law. 
Constitutions usually focus on questions of polity and politics, whereas the EU treaties 
emphasize economic policy. A related debate emerged within the French discourse on the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005, when critics argued that the words “free market” appeared over 
a hundred times in the draft Constitutional Treaty, whereas the word “democracy” rarely was 
mentioned (Wiesner 2014a). In sum, the EU treaties have shifted extensive policy fields out of 
the usual realm of political decision-making in representative democracies.  
Since a constitution is not normally subject to political debate, but only to legal interpretation, 
and since it is difficult to change EU primary law, this has led to a further reduction of the field 
of potential political discussion and decision-making (Grimm 2014, pp. 1050–1052). The field 
of legal interpretation was broadened on the other hand, and the interpreter of the treaties, the 
ECJ, thus acquired considerable influence. It used its interpreter role to drive forward negative 
integration without creating new regulations, since in almost every case it decided in favour of 
abolishing obstacles to the internal market – even where these represented national social 
standards. The ECJ was, in Grimm’s words, a “court with a political agenda” (Grimm 2014, 
pp. 1046–1051).  
 
Yet the former ECJ was not alone in driving forward economic deregulation in the EU. 
Representative democratic institutions also played their part in the process. Here too the picture 
is complex. With the EU Treaties providing a framework, the Commission proposed the 
relevant legislation. The liberalisation agenda was therefore also driven by the Commission, 
and particularly by its DG for competition. Furthermore, EU legislators, i.e., the governments 
of the member states and the European Parliament, often voted in favour of deregulation. This 
means that both the governments of member states and the EP at least helped to pave the way 
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for market liberalisation. But why, then, did they play the game, rather than trying to create 
more positive integration?  
First, this may be explained on the basis of policy preferences. During the first decades of 
integration, member state ministers were the sole legislators in the EEC and EC and hence voted 
on the new laws concerning the creation of the EU’s internal market. From the 1970s onwards 
and particularly after the social democratic era, the governments casting their votes in the 
Council were increasingly led by conservatives and/or liberals. Following the shift from 
Schmidt to Kohl in 1990s Germany, for instance, economic policy increasingly took on a liberal 
market orientation. Third way social democrats like Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder 
continued this trend. Liberal market oriented governments not only shaped their own national 
economic policies, but also influenced deregulation policies in the EU through their votes in 
the Council. Deregulation was in their political interests, yet the usual game played ‘at home’ 
was to claim that it was not the respective governments that were responsible for it, but rather 
the EU.  
Since the Maastricht Treaty introduced a joint decision-making process between the European 
Parliament and the Council, the EP has regularly played a role in determining internal market 
legislation. In other words: the European Parliament voted for several of the EU laws that 
reduced obstacles to free-market competition. The relevant decisions were therefore jointly 
taken by the EU’s representative democratic parliament and the Council, and are thus 
underpinned by the EP’s voter input legitimacy. Some prime examples of such laws will be 
discussed below. 
Policy preferences again provide one explanation of this development. In recent decades, the 
European Parliament contained large groups of liberals and conservatives. These groups were 
often in the majority. The EP therefore could not constitute a serious obstacle to the deregulation 
agenda led by the Commission, the Council and the ECJ. Its dominant political groups and the 
fact that it needed to act in a united manner in order to be heard led it to support deregulation 
with only a few exceptions.  
Moreover, there are a number of indicators that lobby groups and economic players tried to 
influence legislation procedures and governance in the policy fields that were discussed3. In 
November 2016, 10447 lobby groups are officially registered at the European Union (European 
Commission 2016). Moreover, there are direct personal relations between the now bankrupt 
American investment bank Goldman Sachs and the ECB, as today´s ECB president Mario 
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 There is a great number of publications that study lobbying in the EU, see, e.g., Rasmussen 2015; Dürr and Mateo 
2014.  
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Draghi formerly was vice-chairman of Goldman Sachs (Streeck 2015: 132). It is, however, 
difficult to prove the influence of lobbies or personal relations without specific and detail case 
studies that would need to be carried out in each case of legislation.  
A further explanation for the Council’s and the European Parliament’s decision-making is that 
first the relevant national governments and then the EP majority bound themselves to the rules 
of the financial markets. As Wolfang Streeck discusses in detail in his book Buying Time, the 
new common currency in the 1990s was not prepared by an economic government that worked 
in favour of economic cohesion. Instead, the convergence criteria, which put restrictions on the 
member states´ spending, were set up as conditions for accessing into the Eurozone (Streeck 
2014, pp. 97–164). The convergence criteria can be seen as an anticipation of today’s austerity 
regime. Since most member states and a majority of the European Parliament supported the 
convergence criteria, this binding of Europe’s institutions to financial austerity continued from 
the 1990s onwards.  
It is only after the legislative processes sketched above that the ECJ came in and subsequently 
interpreted the new rules, and usually as much in favour of re-regulation as possible, thereby 
creating new legal practices (see below). Grimm (Grimm 2014, p. 1050) argues in this regard 
that the Council is a weak legislator because its members do not share similar interests and 
because law-making is dependent on initiatives proposed by the Commission. Moreover, he 
claims that member state governments did not overlook the full consequences of the ECJ 
decisions.  
Most evaluations of the EU’s institutional system, however, would not subscribe to the view 
that the Council is a weak legislator (Hix and Høyland 2011; Tömmel 2014), even if they might 
agree on the diversity of member states’ interests. And can it really be claimed that national 
governments did not “overlook” the game the ECJ would play? It seems unrealistic to expect 
them to be uninformed in this regard. And if they really were, it would seriously question their 
capacity to govern. A legislator, after all, should be aware of the policy outcomes its laws may 
give rise to, even if these only emerge after judiciary action.  
Deregulation in the EU has therefore been supported by the relevant representative-democratic 
institutions, i.e., both by national governments and the EP. This brings us to a question raised 
in Merkel´s 2016 article, namely, why does the EP electorate, and why do the EU member 
states’ electorates, accept their representatives’ subscription to market liberalisation and its 
effects, i.e., the dismantling of the bases of social and political equality? One possible answer 
to this question is that the electorate is not even aware this is happening, since EU policies are 
highly complex and difficult to understand. Another possible answer is that EU laws are often 
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only discussed in the respective member states when they are implemented at the national level; 
in other words, debate does not take place before a given policy is determined, but only 
afterwards.   
What has been sketched so far shows that a complex set of actors and political decisions led the 
EU to act as an agent of economic deregulation. Alongside the major role played by the ECJ, 
the Commission, the respective governments of the member states, and the EP all contributed 
to this process, since they were responsible for (jointly) deciding in favour of deregulation – be 
it because it was in their political interest, or because they bound themselves to a programme 
of financial austerity.  
Three conclusions follow from this: First, then, one would not be justified in arguing that this 
process was non-democratic as a whole, or that it only took place behind closed doors. In truth, 
many layers of political action and representative-democratic decision-making lay behind the 
deregulation process. Second, this fact cannot be underestimated in assessing the relationship 
between democracy and capitalism in the EU. We cannot simply speak of a conspiracy of 
“neoliberals” that led the EU in the wrong direction. Neither can we conclude that only the 
former ECJ, or the DG for competition are the villains of the piece. The picture is much more 
complicated than this, as was noted above in discussing the “democratic deficit”. Third, this 
means that it is theoretically possible that the actors in question might decide to act otherwise, 
even in such a way that the EU could come to defend democracy against capitalism, economic 
circumstances permitting.   
 
4.2. Negative integration and its impact on social rights 
It is ironic that the EU, which originated as an intergovernmental organization rather than a 
supranational democracy, has helped to dismantle the sovereignty of its member states by 
means of liberalisation. The EU’s liberal market orientation has come into conflict with its 
member states’ representative democracies in several respects. Two examples shall be briefly 
sketched here: a) social and workers’ rights and b) the governance of the financial crisis (see 
4.3.).  
Social rights can be considered an elementary prerequisite of democracy (for a detailed 
discussion see Wiesner 2012) in the sense that unfettered social inequality hinders equal 
democratic participation and representation. In the history of modern citizenship, social rights 
such as the right to social protection have been bound to nation states. In order to be sustainable, 
social rights require a solid financial basis. Thus far, only nation states have been able to provide 
this basis, since only they can collect the necessary taxes – at least as long as the EU does not 
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obtain a right of taxation (a proposal that has been repeatedly discussed). While they themselves 
have not produced equality, tax-financed schooling, healthcare, and childcare benefits have 
helped to equip most citizens with a material and educational basis for social and political 
participation. Nevertheless, the substance of social rights has been diminished through the 
financialisation of capitalism and EU austerity programmes. Social benefits and the safety nets 
of the welfare state have been curtailed in order to increase member states’ competitiveness in 
a globalised economy. Alongside rising income inequality, this has contributed to increasing 
inequalities in social and political participation.  
Furthermore, negative integration has also had problematic effects. EU-specific citizenship 
rights are mainly comprised of market-related freedoms, in addition to a core set of political 
rights linked to EU citizenship. Thus far, social rights have rarely been defined at the EU level 
(for a detailed discussion see Wiesner 2007). Moreover, negative integration has also affected 
national social rights. Two ECJ judgements are highly instructive here. The posted workers 
directive (European Union 2006) stipulates the conditions governing workers posted to other 
EU member states. The cases of Rüffert and Laval were concerned with the working conditions 
in the states to which these workers were posted, as well as the right of trade unions to protest 
these conditions. In its rulings, the ECJ attempted to interpret these rights as narrowly as 
possible, arguing explicitly that the posted workers directive defined maximum rather than 
minimum standards. Member states receiving posted workers could therefore only demand that 
the posting companies keep to the standards defined in the directive. In the Rüffert case 
(European Court of Justice 2008), the ECJ judged that the German federal state of Lower 
Saxony could not take action against a German company that did not pay the agreed wages to 
workers employed by a Polish subcontractor. In the Laval case (European Court of Justice 
2007), the ECJ even decided that national trade unions could only protest or launch strike action 
against companies that are not resident in the respective member states if the issues concerned 
were covered by the posted workers directive. As a result, national governmental actors and 
trade unions are only able to take action in the few cases touched on by the posted workers 
directive. In all other cases, legal action or strikes against companies that bypass national social 
standards are legally excluded.  
 
4.3. Austerity, financial crisis and representative democracy 
The financial crisis gave rise to a number of new challenges for national representative 
democracies in the EU’s multilevel system (for a detailed discussion see Wiesner 2016). The 
governance structures for the budgetary aid dispensed through the European Stability 
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Mechanism (ESM) constitute an intergovernmental structure parallel to the institutional system 
comprised by the EU treaties. The current ESM is an intergovernmental construction based on 
a treaty concluded between the Eurozone member states (European Council 2012). 
Nevertheless, the actors involved in the ESM are to a large extent identical to the EU actors 
under the Lisbon Treaty, comprising heads and/or ministers of member states, the EU 
Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB).  
The oft-cited “Troika” consisting of representatives of the EU commission, the ECB, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) not only monitors all conditions linked to any financial 
assistance, but is also in charge of negotiating these terms and formulating them in memoranda 
of understanding in accordance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty (European Council 2012). 
The Troika therefore has a decisive yet highly opaque role in crisis management. The ESM 
Treaty determines the members and the general tasks of the Troika, yet it neither sets limits on 
its competencies nor establishes standards for its accountability. In particular, it remains 
unclear: if and to what extent the Troika’s powers supersede those of member states, their 
governments, and their parliaments; how the Troika´s powers relegate to the  Troika – the ECB, 
the Commission, and the IMF; and how they relate to the Eurogroup’s governments. This 
structure is opaque and its accountability remains unclear.  
To better understand the setting, it is helpful to look at what happened in reality. The Greek 
case is instructive in this regard. The results of the Greek bailout negotiations, the memoranda 
of understanding, hint at the budgetary rights of the Greek parliament being at least severely 
impeded. The memoranda define very detailed measures and spending cuts, naming 
percentages as well as areas and programmes in which the cuts need to be carried out (European 
Commission 2012, 2015).  
Yet budgetary rights are to be understood, for good reasons, as one of the crown jewels of a 
parliament: a budget symbolically and materially expresses the will of the parliamentary 
majority by way of defining specific policies and a budget for them. Even if the Greek 
parliament voted in favour of the memoranda in each case (in the case of the first memorandum, 
however, only in an unconstitutional emergency law), this does not mean that it actually had 
something substantial to decide upon. The conditions were so detailed that there was little room 
left for any substantial parliamentary decisions on the budget. Yet a parliament that ultimately 
cannot decide on the details of its budget and between genuine budgetary alternatives has lost 
its core role as a parliament. Its decisions are then not only de-politicised, but also void of the 
substance of parliamentarianism. In such cases, parliament’s role is limited simply to holding 
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referenda (voting merely yes or no) rather than the core parliamentary tasks of deliberating and 
voting. 
Furthermore, the horizontal balance of powers between member states was impeded by the new 
developments, since the parliaments of donor states were able to jointly decide on the conditions 
for budgetary aid. As a result, the German Bundestag was able to have a say on the Greek 
budget – a side-effect that was surely never intended by the treaties.  
Finally, the financial crisis has given rise to two further challenges for democratic nation states. 
The first is a conflict between creditworthiness and national sovereignty. Where a state loses 
the confidence of the financial markets, its sovereignty is severely impeded, as the Greek case 
also demonstrates.  
The second challenge concerns the role of austerity regulations in this context. The conditions 
of financial assistance, far more explicitly than the convergence criteria, effectively function as 
concealed national objectives – concealed because not even the EU treaties define financial 
austerity as a goal. In the debtor state Portugal the president made this explicit when he stated 
in the aftermath of an election that he would only name a new government that accepted the 
Troika’s conditions. But most EU states today are subject to austerity programmes that 
influence policies to a considerable extent. Even donor states and all other member states that 
are subject to the Fiscal Compact or the European Semester regulations have to accept the 
austerity conditions contained therein.  
How should these developments be assessed? Are they part of a de-democratising trend within 
the EU? Are they even a sign of a rising “authoritarian liberalism”? Or do they simply constitute 
a strange new framework that is nonetheless legitimate in the context of the treaties (Müller-
Graff 2011)?  
Here I would again argue for the middle ground. The financial crisis presents representative 
democracy in the EU with a number of new challenges. The Eurogroup and particularly the 
members of the Troika make themselves agents of the financial markets when they claim that 
states must accept austerity conditions in spite of the results of democratic elections and 
referenda. The financial crisis is therefore a blatant example of shifting decision-making powers 
not only to executives, but also to agents that formally act on behalf of EU institutions or 
Eurozone members, and all behind closed doors. Yet there are alternatives to such practices. 
 
5. Democracy and capitalism reconciled in the EU? 
In sum, of the four challenges to democracy discussed in the above-mentioned articles (see 
Merkel 2016, p. 63 for a summary) we can conclude that two are manifested starkly in and by 
16 
 
the EU: a vulnerability to state-capture by powerful economic interests and the shifting of 
political decision-making powers away from parliaments to executives and – we should add – 
the judiciary and agents acting for the EU´s institutions or Eurozone member states. In the 
following I shall claim that there are possible solutions to these problems. 
 
5.1. Can the EU regulate capitalism? 
The first question to be addressed is whether the EU is at all able to help regulate financial 
capitalism. My claim is that there are a number of good reasons to think that it is only the EU 
that can do so, rather than any nation state. While one might argue that Germany is an influential 
enough economic power to be a global player, Belgium and Lithuania, for example, are not. In 
a globalised economy, a return to the nation state hence would not help to protect democracy 
against capitalism – at least as long as globalised capitalism is not significantly re-embedded. 
But this idea seems far more utopian than the possibility of the EU contributing to the regulation 
of financial capitalism. In a globalised capitalist world, the EU is the only political actor that 
can exert a decisive enough influence in favour of an increased market regulation. In his above-
mentioned article, Colin Crouch offers a pessimistic version of this argument: 
“I am forced to argue that to reassert democracy against global capitalism requires a 
move from a more democratic (national) gremium to a less democratic (European) one. 
But this is because the former simply cannot tackle the task required at the necessary 
level. If the neoliberal direction of travel of European integration cannot be turned, I 
see no level of action powerful enough to do the task at all.” (Crouch 2015, p. 71).  
 
A more optimistic version of this argument can nonetheless be offered. First, the EU is capable 
of helping to regulate globalised financial capitalism simply because of its size: the EU’s 
internal market is large enough to impose conditions on investors and force them to adapt to 
these. It exceeds China’s internal market in size, and China, for instance, was able to force 
Google to change its policy by threatening to deny market access. Second, if a global player of 
the EU’s size were to lead a united global attempt to regulate financial capitalism rather than 
supporting deregulation, it could thereby contribute to introducing greater regulation and re-
embedding capitalism in the global context. Third, the EU has repeatedly given proof of this 
capacity in dealing with global players such as Microsoft and Google. It was EU competition 
law, driven by the DG for competition and the ECJ, that hindered Microsoft’s and Apple’s 
attempts to establish de facto monopolies. It was also the Commission’s DG for competition 
that proposed the abolition of roaming costs for mobile phones. The EU data protection rules 
were also successfully defended by the ECJ against Facebook. Fourth, there is proof that the 
EU is capable of creating positive integration, as evinced by its directives on antidiscrimination. 
17 
 
The EU’s antidiscrimination rules were pushed forward by the Commission, the Council, the 
European Parliament, and the ECJ acting to a large extent in unison, and the rules are so far-
reaching that member states such as Germany were forced to considerably improve on their 
previous rules in this area (for a detailed discussion see Wiesner 2007).  
The way in which the EU might become a bulwark against financialised capitalism, or even a 
major contributor to its re-regulation, may seem surprisingly simple at first sight. I would argue 
that, in principle, the EU would need to use the very means that helped to embed capitalism in 
the nation state context in the first place: legislation that regulates the economy and protects 
democracy, along with political debates about the goals of economic policy. Due to the 
complexity of the EU context discussed above, however, it will be much more complicated to 
successfully apply these measures at the EU level than at the nation state level.  
 
5.2. Reconciling democracy and capitalism in the EU: between big and pragmatic 
solutions 
In order for the EU to become an agent capable of regulating financialised capitalism, it would 
need to pass laws promoting positive integration and re-regulation both internally and 
externally. But the political majorities in the European Parliament and in the EU’s member 
states would need to support this approach. This means that a political battle on this topic would 
have to be waged – and won – in the 28 (soon-to-be 27) member states.  
Furthermore, the differentiated integration that we are currently experiencing would need to be 
questioned. There are different degrees of integration in different policy areas, and there are 
different degrees of integration among different groups of member states. The EU is thus 
dispersed across a wide range of different regulation regimes and schemes, including joint 
decision-making processes in the internal market, an intergovernmental Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, the Eurogroup that unites the euro-countries, and the Schengen System that is 
yet another structure that is only partly linked to the EU. This dispersion of a polity as big as 
the EU also creates differing patterns of legitimisation and control. While this practice worked 
successfully for quite some time, it seems to have been brought to an end by the current 
migration and euro “crises”. If the EU were to successfully contribute to re-embedding 
capitalism, this dispersion would have to be overcome to some extent at least. 
In order to reduce the CJEU’s role as an agent of liberalisation, it would be necessary to change 
large swathes of the EU’s primary law into secondary law, so that economic policy goals could 
be subject to political debate and politicised decision-making. But this would require a major 
treaty change, which under current EU conditions seems highly unlikely, especially since some 
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of the member state governments (Germany first of all) would not subscribe to the goal of 
politicising, democratising, and regulating economic policymaking in the EU.  
Moreover, were these changes to be implemented, the EU’s task would be to contribute to 
reducing the current trend toward a two-thirds society in which a third of the citizens have 
decoupled from economic and social participation. This would require not only economic 
regulation, but also job creation and changes to production conditions and practices in the EU 
– and hence at least a partial re-regulation of the globalised economy, or the creation of an EU 
“jobs miracle”.  
Neither of these changes seems likely in the foreseeable future. Thus far, there is little 
agreement even on the basic goals of the EU. Should it simply continue to construct an internal 
market, as it has so far? Should the EU be rebuilt or scaled down? Or should the EU constitute 
a means of creating a truly supranational democracy and work to regulate capitalism?  
Given the obstacles to turning the EU into a unified actor in re-embedding capitalism, I would 
like to suggest six possible paths to achieving this goal, each of which differ with respect to the 
degree and the range of political action they would require. Even in cases where agreement is 
extremely difficult to reach, the last path will remain a viable option. 
1) The “big solution” would be to turn the EU into a force against globalised, deregulated, 
financialised capitalism, by winning political battles in this field in at least two thirds of 
the soon-to-be 27 member states, including the larger member states.  
2) The “second biggest solution” would be to politicise the EU by de-constitutionalising a 
large amount of EU secondary law, as discussed above. This could be combined with 
the following:  
3) Halting differentiated integration and re-integrating the EU. Differences between fully 
and partly integrated policy fields and different forms of regulation, law-making and 
policy-making could be reduced and ultimately abolished. At the same time, joint 
decision-making should become the legislative norm in all of the EU’s policy fields.  
4) Creating a fully fledged and democratically legitimized transfer union in the EU - even 
if it would remain to be discussed whether such a transfer union could be sustainable in 
light of the persisting economic differences within the EU.   
5) Establishing a Eurochamber in the European Parliament as a democratic co-legislator 
for the Eurogroup – this would at least increase legitimacy and accountability in the 
Eurozone, even if the ultimate outcome might not significantly change.  
6) The most minimal solution would be to defend what there is to be defended, i.e., to limit 
the untoward effects on national representative democracies. EU-led policies, as has 
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been discussed, threaten the democratic standards and rights of the EU’s member states. 
In order to remedy this problem, transparency, accountability and the vertical balance 
of powers need to be better protected, i.e. key decision making powers have to be taken 
away from indirectly legitimized agents such as the Troika. Furthermore, the substance 
of parliamentary decision-making competencies needs to be safeguarded even under 
austerity conditions, for example by defining the amounts of expenditure that would 
need to be reduced, but not the policies required to do so. 
In conclusion, there is no more nor less reason why the EU should be an agent or even the 
Trojan horse of capitalism than that a nation state should be. In light of the foregoing discussion, 
it does not seem to be an option to just wait and see how the crisis will go on. Continuing 
disintegration (Britain might not be the last member state to exit the EU), growing criticism of 
the EU, increasing problems of governance and cooperation at the EU level (e.g. in the field of 
migration and refugees), and growing inequalities between both citizens and EU member states 
rather serve to increase the pressure on all of the plyers mentioned – including member state 
governments and parliaments, the European Parliament, the Commission, and even the CJEU 
(formerly the ECJ) and the ECB.  
But while there is pressure to act, it seems difficult to predict whether there will indeed be action 
and which direction it might take. The EU currently is torn into several different directions. 
Brexit is taken as a reason against further integration and regulation by many member state 
governments especially in Eastern Europe. Fear of right-wing and left-wing populists and their 
potential victories in the forthcoming national elections such as in France also seems to speak 
against “more Europe”. Commission and European Parliament, and in particular their 
presidents Juncker and Schulz, on the other hand, seem to recognise the pressure to act very 
well and claim it openly.  
As there is a dissensus on the EU and its state of the art, why not discuss this openly after all? 
There is good reason to have an open, public, and political debate about the EU and its political 
goals in all of the member states, by politicians and citizens alike, and there is no reason to 
avoid it. On the contrary: if defenders of representative democracy do not stage this debate, it 
may simply be led by extremists, populists and antidemocrats. It seems to be time for a new 
battle of ideas on the future of the EU, and it seems to be time for politics, finally.  
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